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In contrast to American Indian and sport fishermen, commercial fishermen placed a tremendous demand on Lake Michigan's resources in the years prior to the creation of the sport fishery. As historian Margaret Beattie Bogue has shown, by the 1840s, Euro-American fishermen were making claims upon Lake Michigan fisheries within a context increasingly defined by corporate priorities. The same forces that challenged the ability of farmers, loggers, and others employed in the region's extractive industries to operate as independent, autonomous agents in the free market also affected the ability of individual fishermen to uphold their occupation's orientation to local markets and informal family or community management systems. 12 The pressures of industrial capitalism, not the failure of traditional patterns of resource use, prompted Great Lakes commercial fishermen to respond to diminishing stocks in the 1870s and i88os by purchasing steam, and later, gasoline-and diesel-powered fish tugs so they could fish longer and harder. By 1885, commercial fish production in Michigan's Great Lakes waters was at its height, with an estimated 8.i million pounds of whitefish and 5 million pounds of lake trout harvested annually. A decade later, whitefish harvests dipped to 3.3 million while lake trout increased to 6.2 million. Throughout the early twentieth century, stocks declined steadily with combined whitefish and lake trout harvests falling from 13.8 million pounds in 1930 to 6.9 million pounds ten years later. After World War II, the combined harvest of all high-grade commercial species was 12 million pounds in 1955 and 7 million pounds in 1965 . 13 Fishery stocks in Michigan's Great Lakes waters declined, in part, as a result of over-fishing brought about by improvements in commercial fishing technology and methods. Fishermen became more and more technically efficient at catching fish at the very time when the most urban of the lakes, Lake Michigan, was under assault from sewage from lakeshore cities and industrial waste from the mills and factories that produced lumber, paper, automobiles, machinery, electrical power, and processed agricultural products such as sugar beets.14 Following World War II, the damage done by the non-indigenous sea lamprey, an eel-like parasite that infested Lake Michigan and its tributaries in the 1930s, became increasingly evident: Lake trout and other commercial stocks dropped sharply.
By the time the U.S. Commission on Fish and Fisheries was created in 1871 and the Michigan Fish Commission established two years later, pollution was a problem in the Great Lakes, particularly near the largest cities on the lakeshore.15 During World War I, when concern about the wartime food shortages was high, University of Illinois professor of entomology S. A. Forbes found that Chicago's "trade waste" had the potential to reduce the nation's food supply by an estimated 15 million pounds of fish a year. Water was pumped from Lake Michigan into the Chicago River in order to pass a "'slow moving mass of filth' through the drainage canal and into the Illinois River.""6 Small cities also contributed to the pollution of Lake Michigan. According to a 1934 report in Michigan Tradesman, fish spawning grounds at Muskegon and Grand Haven were "entirely unfit to function in this natural process." 17 From the late nineteenth century through World War II, an informal division of labor or jurisdiction existed between state and federal fisheries officials In the late 1950s, once it appeared that TFM and other lamprey control measures were effective in reducing (although not eliminating) sea lamprey propagation, the Department of Conservation prepared to assert its authority over Michigan's Great Lakes waters. By 1964, for the first time in nearly a century, Michigan fisheries officials adopted policy goals that placed them at odds with their federal counterparts.22 The decision by the Department of Conservation officials to stock salmon in Michigan waters placed them on a collision course with the USFWS. Federal fisheries officials were committed to the restoration of the commercial fishery by rebuilding stocks of lake trout until natural regeneration took place. The restoration of Great Lakes commercial fishing not only was a second priority to the Michigan Department of Conservation, it ultimately was viewed as a threat to the creation of a Great Lakes sport fishery.
The alewife crisis of the mid-to late 196os revealed the growing distance between state and federal fisheries officials over the management of Great Lakes fisheries. The alewife was a non-indigenous species whose population exploded when predatory fish stocks were severely diminished by the sea lamprey. Federal fisheries officials saw the alewife as forage food for the indigenous lake trout they were attempting to re-establish. W. Fenton Carbine, the Great Lakes regional director of the U.S. Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, supported the commercial harvest of alewife in Michigan waters using trawling devices similar to those already in use in Wisconsin. Carbine, who had worked as a biologist for the Michigan Department of Conservation until 1948, appealed to Michigan Governor George Romney in an unsuccessful attempt to halt Department of Conservation officials from stocking salmon in the state's Great Lakes waters. His efforts backfired and even may have resulted in his reassignment out of the Great Lakes Region.13
Michigan's decision to assert its legal jurisdiction over the fisheries in its Great Lakes waters and place sport fishing at the center of its efforts to reconstitute lakeshore land-use patterns can be understood best within the context of post-World War IL America embarking on the mass consumption of outdoor leisure activities. Converting the state's urban waterfronts, harbors, docks, piers, and other facilities from commercial and industrial use to recreational use was a multi-faceted task; it was hardly a policy that fit seamlessly into Lake Michigan's pre-existing urban infrastructure. Quite the contrary, this conversion would require major reconfigurations to the region's maritime landscape. As historian Robert Archibald noted when recalling his childhood in the mining town of Ishpeming, even the remotest corners of Michigan's Upper Peninsula coastline bore physical evidence of over a century of industrialization and exploitation of natural resources. 24 From New Buffalo, Michigan, northward, Lake Michigan's eastern shore was strewn with docks, wharves, shipyards, mills, factories, warehouses, power plants, railroad sidings, coal yards, and other "eyesores" incongruous with the plan to recast the lake as an outdoor recreational paradise. Commercial fishing operations in St. Joseph, Grand Haven, and other Michigan ports were viewed by conservation officials as impediments to economic progress and the promotion of sport fishing, lakeshore real estate, and dining, lodging, and retail facilities catering to sportsmen and leisure travelers. Developers apparently saw little of the picturesque charm of decaying New England fishing villages founded in the age of sail in Great Lakes fishingvillages that bore the stamp of industrialization. Rusting steam or gasoline powered fish tugs, aging fishing sheds, and obsolete reel yards were perceived as unsightly reminders of a dying industry that compromised the tourist appeal of the lakeshore cites and towns, particularly those on the lake's southern shore closest to U.S. Interstate Highway 94, connecting Detroit and Chicago. Commercial fishing operations engendered even less consideration from policy makers when their gill nets and trap nets contained by-catch of game species. 25 Officials in Michigan's Department of Conservation acknowledged the role population and economic pressures played in persuading the state to redevelop HISTORY 9 (JANUARY  2004) its Great Lakes waters to foster economic development and recreation as early as
1955:
Economists and other authorities tell us that certain trends and conditions basic to a continued increase in vacationing are apparently here to stay. They say, for instance, that the population spiral is just beginning to gather speed. They point to earlier retirements, longer vacations, higher incomes, more automobiles, and more and better highways.
The total of these conditions is a demand; a relentless, exacting demand upon those fundamental resources, land and water. Here, then, is the CONCERN. If more and more people are going to use Michigan's land and water in the fulfillment of vacation pleasures, where do we go from here?26
In 1959, Justin W. Leonard of the Michigan Department of Conservation observed that mankind insisted on "being clothed, housed, and transported by the latest developments of science. But when we go fishing, we shuck off civilization's thin veneer." Now that man faced the "constant threat of atomic annihilation," outdoor activities such as fishing were more important than ever because they offered the chance to "prove to ourselves that we are still as able to fend for ourselves as our primitive ancestors." 27 Leonard believed that Michigan was well positioned to offer anxiety-ridden urban dwellers the restorative outdoor recreation and "elbow room" they craved. The state's ability to provide sport fishing and other forms of recreation "in, on, and near water" into the l990S and beyond depended, he argued, on careful natural-resource planning beginning with the Great Lakes. The Great Lakes offered the strongest prospect for the type of sport fishing that was the antithesis of "easy, predictable, and wholly certain methods of taking fish that science makes possible." 28 Reacting to these sentiments, the Michigan Department of Conservation began to forge a fisheries policy and a rhetorical campaign that fused the perceived economic benefits of favoring sport over commercial fishing with cultural perceptions regarding the therapeutic value of outdoor recreation. In 1967, Glen C. Greg, the department's deputy director for recreation, viewed state appropriations for the construction of recreational facilities as necessary to counter "city ills occasioned by a lack of suitable playgrounds, of concrete without the relief of greenery nearby." Greg, like earlier generations of social workers and reformers, believed that fishing and other wholesome outdoor pursuits offered the potential to uplift city dwellers morally. 29 The Michigan Department of Conservation defended its decision to favor sport over commercial and subsistence fishery claims in part by downplaying the importance of the commercial harvest. Claude VerDuin, the editor of the industry periodical The Fisherman, complained as early as 1948 that the effort to combat sea lamprey infestation "was too little and too late" to save the commercial fishing industry. He saw the Department of Conservation's early failure to protect lake trout and whitefish as vanquishing any hope of reviving commercial fishing. 30 The sea lamprey's destruction of commercial fishing stocks did in fact, help the Department of Conservation break what remained of the political and I 109 economic power of Michigan's commercial fishing industry and quell any opposition to shifting its policy orientation to favor sport fishing. Through its official organ, Michigan Conservation, and other media, the department suggested that commercial fishing had gone the way of logging and mining; it was an industry whose economic and cultural significance to the state and its people lay only in the past. A 1955 profile of commercial fisherman Adson Casey portrayed the Fairport, Michigan, native as a member of a dying breed for whom a "sad violin should be played." Despite an acknowledgement that such a response was "no answer for these are men and this is their work and they are not giving it up," the Department of Conservation accepted no responsibility for its part in the demise of commercial fishing. Nor did it contemplate any type of direct or indirect financial aid for Casey or other commercial fisherman reduced to the pursuit of "marginal species" such as chub in order to pay their bills. 31 The Casey article still concluded with the admonishment that the commercial fishing industry "deserves whatever support the public can give" because it was "good conservation" and a "'wise use' of a natural resource." Furthermore, readers were reminded that commercial fishing was economically "important to Given carte blanche by MacMullan to do something "spectacular" for Great Lakes fisheries, Tanner downplayed the economic and historical importance of the commercial fishing industry to Michigan. In 1965, he argued that the "commercial fishery, while providing livelihood for several hundred people, was never a major fishery by marine standards." Hampered by its "small" size and plagued by "numerous problems ranging from marketing difficulties to overharvesting," the industry "suffered a long gradual decline."37 Now, the gravely ill patient looked only for a merciful end to its sufferings.
With the commercial fishing industry reduced to a shadow of its former self, Tanner was confident that the time had come for the Great Lakes to serve the growing demand for outdoor recreation. Eager to reverse the downward trend in the sale of state fishing licenses, he was convinced that the development of a Great Lakes sport fisheryby plantingvarious types of Pacific salmon in Michigan waters would create renewed interest in angling. Tanner maintained that the management of Great Lakes for sport fishing offered "the most good to the most people." He claimed that even though the state's Great Lakes waters now would "be managed first for the benefit of the recreational fishermen," there was still a place for the commercial fishing industry. In order to achieve "an appropriate maximum harvest," commercial fishermen would be allotted the fish that recreational fishermen either did not want or could not catch. 38 The Michigan Department of Conservation made the decision to stock nonindigenous salmon in the sixth largest body of fresh water in the world with remarkably little preparation and public input. Tanner and state fisheries officials broke with tradition when they began stocking salmon over the objections of the USFWS, but they did not violate or disregard state or federal environmental laws and restrictions. As former gubernatorial environmental adviser Dave Dempsey has observed, procedures such as the preparation of an environmental impact statement, familiar to policy markers and administrators today, did not exist. 39 Tanner and Wayne Tody, the fisheries scientist who replaced Tanner when he joined the faculty of Michigan State University in 1966, asserted their authority I 111 over their federal counterparts through the salmon-stocking program. Given their go-it-alone approach, it is hardly surprising that they did not conceive of the salmon-stocking program from a multi-state or bi-national perspective. Furthermore, the Department of Conservation did not consult with state or local leaders involved in economic development, tourism, and other related areas. Conservation officials apparently believed that the other Great Lakes states and Canada would rally behind the sport fishery once it took off. When "coho fever" gripped the Lake Michigan coast, they thought, the wisdom of Michigan's decision to forge ahead to create a Great Lakes sport fishery and close the door on its commercial fishing past would be evident. News of the rapid growth of coho could hardly be contained; it reportedly "spread like wild-fire among sportsmen." In Frankfort and other lakeshore cities and towns, economic and social conditions "resembled a gold rush," in the words of the nationally prominent outdoor writer Ben East. Sports Illustrated observed that crowds of fishermen made west Michigan's port cities appear as though they had "virtually been upended." After talking to a local citizen, sports fisherman and writer Jerry Chiappetta described anglers swarming the municipal boat launch in Manistee and working out a system whereby at certain times on Labor Day weekend, 1-3 September i967, they were launching a boat every thirty seconds. 43 Chiappetta reported to Field & Stream readers that the Manistee Board of Commerce enlisted volunteers to aid the droves of fishermen who came to the city to spend Labor Day weekend in pursuit of salmon. While engaged in this civic service, the volunteers gathered demographic and consumer preference information from the fishermen. They discovered that many anglers came to the city "by boat from Chicago, Michigan City, Milwaukee, and many other cities hundreds of miles away." Other fishermen arrived on airliners "loaded with passengers" or traveled by automobile on "jammed" highways. 44 Representatives from the Department of Conservation who observed the coho fishing scene during the i967 Labor Day weekend estimated that about six thousand sallmon averaging twelve pounds each were caught. Some of the coho caught by holiday anglers weighed up to twenty-two pounds.4 The h 967 Labor Day weekend not only marked the beginning of Great Lakes sport fishing tourism in Michigan, it also helped to inaugurate a sales frenzy of fishing magazines and guidebooks, boats, outboard motors, tackle, and guide services and charter boat excursions-a frenzy that would last for nearly a decade.
SPORT FISHING AS REMEDY FOR AILING COMMUNITIES MICHIGAN'S DECISION to switch the focus of its Great
Fishing magazines and guidebooks such as Catching Coho! presented Great Lakes salmon fishing as exciting and glamorous. These publications assured novice fishermen that with a few simple instructions and the right gear, they could net a fish that would impress their friends and co-workers. In the early spring of 1970, Field & Stream reported on prolific runs of salmon in the southern end of Lake Michigan where "even Chicago's pier pigeons got their licks in." 46 Fishing magazines and guidebooks also aided experienced fishermen who followed the seasonal migration of the prized game fish. Chicago anglers were instructed to head out to Lake Michigan as soon as the ice broke up before the coho moved farther out into the lake and began to move northward. 47 Fishing publications not only spread the word about the Great Lakes sport fishery, they also boosted the growth of a market for boats, outboard engines, fishing tackle, and other related goods and services. Boat dealers in Lake The demand for sport fishing gear soared not only because the salmon fishery attracted many new fishermen, but also because many veteran sportsmen discovered that their existing gear was not sufficient to catch game fish in the Great Lakes. Down riggers were necessary to get hooks to the depths where a salmon or lake trout might be found, especially in warm weather. Even fishermen who began the season with all the latest coho fishing gear often found it necessary to return to the tackle shop for more. Russell McKee of the Department of Conservation observed that salmon often ruined fishing gear because they "fight with mean-tempered fury." Fishermen whose "rods were broken, reels stripped, The Department of Conservation faced little serious criticism from state or local elected officials, nationally known sportswriters like East, Chiappetta, and Cartier, or organizations such as the Manistee Board of Commerce for its failure to prepare lakeshore communities for the onslaught of sports fishermen. The state did not construct boat launches, docks, fish cleaning stations, campgrounds, and other public facilities before they arrived. On 23 September 1967 it became evident, in the words of one observer, that coho fever was "more than the small towns of the area of the salmon streams were prepared for." The storm that stuck off the coasts of Frankfort, Honor, and Manistee on that day claimed the lives of seven fishermen. An estimated 150 fishermen whose boats overturned in the high winds and waves were rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard. 59 The tragedy forced the Department of Conservation to acknowledge that many of the factory, office, and retail workers it encouraged to head out on the big lakes during their leisure hours had neither the expertise nor the equipment to safely boat and fish on the Great Lakes. In anticipation of the opening of the 1968 fishing season, the Department of Conservation "planned everything possible to give coho fishermen maximum safety." The U.S. Coast Guard further helped to assure sportsmen by agreeing to rescue boaters by helicopter if necessary.60
The deadly September 1967 storm on Lake Michigan's coho coast increased public awareness of the potential risks of Great Lakes sport fishing but failed to dampen enthusiasm for it. As MacMullan, Tanner In order to promote the salmon fishery, the Department of Conservation arranged for Stan Lievense, a staff biologist whose talent as a sport fishermen later gained him entry into the National Sport Fishing Hall of Fame, to be hired by the state's tourism bureau. As Michigan's official "coho ambassador," he traveled around the state and the region speaking to sportsmen's groups and demonstrating the use of fishing gear developed specifically to catch salmon in the Great Lakes. 63 In order to protect America's newest sport fishing frontier and alleviate growing public concern with pollution in the Great Lakes, the Department of Conservation began to work in closer cooperation with those charged with overseeing water quality on the Great Lakes at the state and federal level. The DNR decreased the number of commercial fishermen by adopting the concept of limited-entry fishing. This policy limited commercial licenses to fishermen who fished for more than fifty days in two of any of the three preceding years and met certain fishing income requirements. Later, the DNR introduced the concept of zone fishing, which required fishermen to use particular types of gear in particular geographical locations. Quotas were established, with each licensee assigned a portion of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC).
Commercial fishermen resisted the DNR's efforts to drive them off the Great Lakes. Claude Ver Duin, commercial fishing advocate and editor of The Fisherman, challenged the state's right to deny a fisherman the right to practice his trade or vocation because he is not "making enough money." He charged that the department's limited entry policy put hundreds of "'little fisherman"' out of business to benefit a small handful of well-financed operators who could afford to purchase the trap-net gear DNR officials claimed better protected fishery stocks. 68 The DNR dismissed allegations of unfairness made by Ver Duin and other commercial fishing advocates, although officials acknowledged that change "involving restrictions on one's livelihood is particularly hard to accept." Commercial fishing had to be eliminated or sharply curtailed, in the agency's estimation, because the industry was on a "collision course with sport fishermen" and was "inconsistent with optimum management."69 Despite the legal challenges by commercial fishermen to the DNR's new policies, the number of commercial fishermen declined precipitously on Lake Michigan and Michigan's other Great Lakes waters during the 1970s. The number of commercial fishing license holders dropped from more than seven hundred in 1967 to less than two hundred by 1970. In 1971, James Brown, a Mackinac County prosecutor who was described as a "friend of the fishermen," calculated that in the previous three years, the DNR had "zoned down to less than lo per cent of Michigan Great Lakes waters the area open to fishing operations."7?
Among the commercial fishing license holders who could not meet Michigan's ever tightening restrictions were American Indians. Howard Tanner With the creation of the Great Lakes sport fishery, Tanner may not have stuck a "devil's bargain," in the words of Rothman. But he certainly helped to accelerate the rate of economic and social change in the cities and towns along the shore of Lake Michigan. Tourism related to sport fishing not only has brought traffic and congestion, but has contributed to rising real estate values that make it difficult if not impossible for wage earners and business owners of limited economic means to retain their land, especially if it is on or near the lakeshore. In an examination of the impact of sport fishing on local Native Americans, historian Robert Doherty concluded that tourism has "seldom helped long-term residents towards economic security. It merely hid them behind the facade of affluence. Northern Michigan may seem better off than it was thirty years ago, but only because newcomers moved in and pushed the former residents aside. This process, by which tourism reallocated resources, can be clearly seen in the development of the Great Lakes sport fishery." 74 The economic cost of the creation of the sport fishery also should be examined in relation to its environmental effects. The most obvious environmental problem was the annual "die-off " of salmon when Great Lakes tributary rivers and streams were fouled by thousands of dead and decaying salmon. One irate angler complained that if the DNR insisted "on stocking more of these living pollutants and adding to our already horribly fouled up ecology," it should "put 'em in a river already turned sewer." 75 During 
